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a b s t r a c t 
The revised Payment Services Directive (‘PSD2’) has been adopted to stimulate the devel- 
opment of an integrated internal market for payment services. In particular, it facilitates 
payment initiation services and account information services by granting the providers of 
these services access to the accounts of the payment service users. At the same time, the 
recitals state that the PSD2 guarantees a high level of consumer protection, security of pay- 
ment transactions and protection against fraud. 
This paper answers the following question: To what extent does the access to accounts of the 
payment initiation service providers and account information service providers balance the develop- 
ment of the market for payment services with the security of the payment account and the privacy 
of the user? An analysis of the PSD2 shows that the development of the market for payment 
services has a higher priority. Security and privacy are ultimately subordinate. 
First, the PSD2 does not adequately protect the personal data of the users. The definition 
of ‘account information service’ is broad and covers a wide range of services. This allows 
the payment service providers to circumvent the limitations of the access to accounts. 
Next, the payment service providers have a ‘fall back option’ that allows ‘screen scraping’ 
if the dedicated interface is not functioning properly. Although this access is constrained by 
several safeguards, the fall back option gives the payment services provider unlimited access 
to the account of the user. 
Finally, the payment service providers have considerable freedom to arrange their au- 
thentication process as they see fit. The banks seem to be required to trust this process. The 
PSD2 and regulatory technical standards do not demand that a bank is able to verify the 
authentication or the integrity of the payment order. 
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1. Introduction 
The European revised Payment Services Directive (‘PSD2’) 1 has 
several objectives. Since the adoption of the first Payment Ser- 
vices Directive, 2 the retail payments market has experienced 
significant growth and innovation. The PSD2 has been adopted 
to adapt the legal framework to these developments.3 It aims 
to contribute to legal certainty, harmonisation, competition 
and to the development of an integrated internal market. At 
the same time, the recitals state that the PSD2 guarantees a 
high level of consumer protection, security of payment trans- 
actions and protection against fraud.4 
The PSD2 creates a legal framework for two new types of 
payment services: ‘payment initiation services’ and ‘account 
information services’. In particular, it facilitates these services 
by obligating ‘account servicing payment service providers’ 
(banks) to give the ‘payment initiation service providers’ and 
‘account information service providers’ access to the on- 
line ‘payment accounts’ of the ‘payment service user’ free 
of charge.5 The introduction of this ‘access to accounts’ has 
important consequences for the payment services providers, 
banks and users ( Section 2 ). The exact design of this access 
depends on the regulatory technical standards for strong cus- 
tomer authentication and common and secure open stan- 
dards of communication (‘RTS’, Section 3 ).6 It is important for 
1 Directive (EU) 2015/2366 of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 25 November 2015 on payment services in the in- 
ternal market, amending Directives 2002/65/EC, 2009/110/EC and 
2013/36/EU and Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010, and repealing Di- 
rective 2007/64/EC [2015] OJ L337/35. 
2 Directive 2007/64/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 13 November 2007 on payment services in the internal 
market amending Directives 97/7/EC, 2002/65/EC, 2005/60/EC and 
2006/48/EC and repealing Directive 97/5/EC [2007] OJ L319/1. 
3 PSD2, recitals 3–4, 7, 11, 13, 18–19, 27–29; Commission, ‘Impact 
assessment Accompanying the document Proposal for a directive 
of the European parliament and of the Council on payment ser- 
vices in the internal market and amending Directives 2002/65/EC, 
2013/36/UE and 2009/110/EC and repealing Directive 2007/64/EC 
and Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of 
the Council on interchange fees for card-based payment transac- 
tions’ (Staff Working Document) SWD (2013) 288 final Volume 1/2, 
15–27; Mounaim Cortet, Tom Rijks and Shikko Nijland, ‘PSD2: The 
digital transformation accelerator for banks’ (2015) 10 Journal of 
Payments Strategy & Systems 13, 18; Mary Donnelly, ‘Payments 
in the digital market: Evaluating the contribution of Payment Ser- 
vices Directive II’ (2016) 32 Computer Law & Security Review 827, 
827–829; Reinhard Steennot, ‘Reduced payer’s liability for unau- 
thorized payment transactions under the second Payment Ser- 
vices Directive (PSD2)’ (2018) 34 Computer Law & Security Review 
954, 954–955. 
4 PSD2, recitals 5–7, 33, 42, 66–67, 69, 75, 77, 84–85, 95, 109. About 
the objectives of the PSD2, see also Commission, ‘Impact assess- 
ment’ (n 3) 35–37. 
5 About these concepts, see PSD2, art 4(10)–(12), (15)–(19), An- 
nex I (7)–(8), recitals 27–29. In this article, we will primarily use 
the terms banks (for account servicing payment service providers), 
payment service providers (if a rule applies to both payment initia- 
tion service providers and account information service providers) 
and users (for payment service user). 
6 Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2018/389 of 27 Novem- 
ber 2017 supplementing Directive (EU) 2015/2366 of the European 
the security of the payment account and personal data of the 
user ( Section 4 ). This article analyses the risks that are cre- 
ated by access to accounts. It answers the following question: 
To what extent does the access to accounts of the payment initiation 
service providers and account information service providers balance 
the development of the market for payment services with the security 
of the payment account and the privacy of the user? An analysis of 
the PSD2 shows that the development of the market for pay- 
ment services has a higher priority. Security and privacy are 
ultimately subordinate ( Section 5 ). 
2. Access to accounts in the legal framework 
of the PSD2 
The legal framework of the PSD2 and access to accounts is 
based on a consideration of various interests. Fintech com- 
panies develop new financial products, including new ways 
to pay or view account information. These payment service 
providers cannot offer their services if the traditional banks 
do not cooperate. After all, the banks control access to the pay- 
ment accounts. This allows them to limit competition on the 
market for payment services. 
The PSD2 restricts this possibility by facilitating payment 
services, in particular by giving the payment initiation service 
providers and account information service providers access 
to the accounts of the users. The exact content of this access 
to accounts depends on the offered payment service. We will 
expand on this in the next subsections. 
The (potential) users of these services benefit from the ac- 
cess to accounts because it allows them to use the services. 
However, the access also creates security and privacy risks. 
For example, it could be misused to steal the available funds. 
The privacy of the users is threatened because new service 
providers gain access to their financial information. This in- 
formation could be abused for identity theft, blackmail, illegal 
pricing discrimination or by selling it to data brokers. These 
risks are not entirely new. They exist under any form of (on- 
line) access to the payment accounts. However, the access of 
the payment service leads to a multiplication of the attack 
vectors ( Section 4.4 ). 
The PSD2 reduces these risks by only allowing the provi- 
sion of payment services by ‘payment service providers’.7 Ar- 
ticle 1(1) of the PSD2 gives an exhaustive list of the categories 
of payment service providers. This list includes member states 
and other public authorities (under f), national central banks 
(under e) and institutions that are governed by another legal 
framework such as credit institutions (under a) or electronic 
money institutions (under b). Furthermore, an undertaking 
that wants to provide payment services can become a ‘pay- 
ment institution’ by obtaining an authorisation from a com- 
petent national authority.8 Such an authorisation allows the 
payment institution to provide the services throughout the 
European Union pursuant to article 11(9) of the PSD2. Article 
Parliament and of the Council with regard to regulatory technical 
standards for strong customer authentication and common and 
secure open standards of communication [2018] L69/23 (‘RTS’). 
7 PSD2, art 4(11), 37(1). 
8 PSD2, art 1(1)(d), 4(4), 5, 11, recital 34. 
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33 exempts institutions that only provide account information 
services from most of the requirements for an authorisation. 
They are only obligated to apply for a registration.9 
The PSD2 is mostly disadvantageous for banks. As account 
servicing payment service providers, they are obligated to give 
the payment service providers access to the accounts of the 
user free of charge. The performance of this obligation can be 
costly. After all, the banks have to set up, maintain and secure 
a system that facilitates this access.10 Moreover, they are con- 
fronted with new liabilities. The banks are obligated to refund 
unauthorised or defective payment transactions, even if the 
transaction is initiated through a payment initiation service 
provider.11 
Furthermore, the banks face new competition. Before the 
PSD2, they controlled the access to accounts.12 Other payment 
services providers had no legal 13 right of access. The PSD2 
removes this competitive advantage. This has consequences 
that reach beyond the market for payment initiation and ac- 
count information services. The use of the services of com- 
petitors reduces the direct interaction between the bank and 
its customers. This weakens their ability to sell other products 
and services or detect fraud . 14 
The banks can also benefit from this development. As 
providers of payment initiation and account information ser- 
vices, the PSD2 allows them to gain access to the accounts of 
the customers of other banks.15 However, it is not likely that 
these possibilities outweigh the disadvantages of increased 
competition. It is expected that they will not only face in- 
creased competition from other banks, but also from large 
technology companies such as Facebook, Apple, Amazon, Mi- 
crosoft and Google.16 The banks have a head start because of 
their expertise, infrastructure and reputation in connection 
with payment services. However, it is not clear to what extent, 
and for how long, these advantages offset the technological 
possibilities, size, market position and access to consumers of 
these technology companies.17 
9 PSD2, art 5(3), recital 48. 
10 See also Thomas Hafstad and others, PSD2 – Strategic opportu- 
nities beyond compliance 11 www.evry.com/globalassets/bransjer/ 
financial-services/bank2020/wp _ psd2/psd2 _ whitepaper.pdf
accessed 25 June 2018; Temenos, Payment Services Directive 
2 (PSD2) (2016) 5 www.temenos.com/globalassets/mi/wp/16/ 
temenos _ psd2 _ whitepaper _ v2.pdf accessed 25 June 2018; Finex- 
tra, PSD2: A strategic game-changer with a long-term impact (CA 
technologies 2018) 19 www.finextra.com/surveys/survey.aspx? 
surveyguid=ba4144f1- cd58- 4c88- 93c1- 8c5d61975732 accessed 25 
June 2018; Filip Caron, ‘The Evolving Payments Landscape’ [2018] 
IT Professional 53, 57. 
11 PSD2, art 73(2), 90; Steennot (n 3) 958. 
12 See also Hafstad and others (n 10) 45. 
13 They were technically able to gain access. Section 4.2 . 
14 See also Temenos (n 10) 5; Finextra (n 10) 10, 21. 
15 See also Hafstad and others (n 10) 11; Temenos (n 10) 11; Finex- 
tra (n 10) 21. 
16 E.g. Hafstad and others (n 10) 46; Finextra (n 10) 10, 15, 24- 
25; Panos Constantinides, Ola Henfridsson and Geoffrey G. Parker, 
‘Introduction – Platforms and Infrastructures in the Digital Age’ 
(2018) 29 Information Systems Research 381, 396. 
17 See also Hafstad and others (n 10) 27, 31, 34–37; Temenos (n 10) 
11, 15; Caron (n 10) 57; Max Geerling, E-commerce: A merchant’s 
2.1. Payment initiation service 
Article 4(15) of the PSD2 defines a payment initiation service 
as “a service to initiate a payment order at the request of the 
payment service user with respect to a payment account held 
at another payment service provider”. Examples of these ser- 
vices are iDEAL in the Netherlands, Sofort in Germany and 
Trustly in Sweden. 
This service can be used to pay for products and services 
that are ordered online. It creates a software bridge between 
the customer and the online merchant. It gives the merchant 
the security that the payment has been initiated successfully, 
allowing him to deliver the goods or services without un- 
due delay.18 Furthermore, the payment initiation service can 
streamline and simplify the payment by the customer. For ex- 
ample, the service can pre-set the amount and the beneficiary 
and eliminate the need to use the (separate) app or website 
of the bank.19 Finally, the payment initiation service can sim- 
plify the authentication. For example, an authentication pro- 
cess that uses a card, card reader and personal identification 
number could be replaced by a mobile phone and a fingerprint 
or facial recognition ( Section 4.4 ). 
The payment initiation service provider can only provide 
its service if the bank executes the transmitted payment or- 
ders. Next, it is necessary that the bank ‘understands’ the or- 
der and is able to establish its origin. For example, a payment 
initiation service cannot be used if the bank treats the ac- 
count number as the amount of the payment. For this rea- 
son, the payment initiation service provider must have access 
to an interface that allows it to transfer the payment orders 
( Section 4.1 ). 
Article 66 of the PSD2 regulates the access to accounts of 
the payment initiation service provider. Paragraph 1 formu- 
lates the freedom to use a payment initiation service provider 
as right of a payer with online access to the payment account. 
Paragraph 2 obligates the bank to honour this right. Pursuant 
to paragraph 4, the bank is obligated to provide information 
about the initiation and execution of the payment transac- 
tion to the payment initiation service provider. Furthermore, 
it must treat payment orders that are transmitted through 
the payment initiation service the same way as orders that 
are transmitted directly by the payer. Pursuant to paragraph 
5, these obligations do not depend on the existence of a con- 
tractual relationship between the bank and the payment initi- 
ation service provider. For this reason, the bank is not allowed 
to charge a fee for the access to the account.20 
Paragraph 3 limits the access in several ways. A payment 
initiation service provider can only supply the obtained in- 
formation to the payee. Furthermore, it can only request data 
that are necessary to provide the service. The payment initia- 
tion service provider is not allowed to store sensitive payment 
data of the user. Pursuant to article 4(31) and (32), this includes 
perspective on innovative solutions in payments’ (2018) 12 Journal 
of Payments Strategy & Systems 58, 60. 
18 PSD2, recital 29; See also Donnelly (n 3) 830; Steennot (n 3) 955. 
19 See also Geerling (n 17) 61. 
20 See also Financial Conduct Authority, Payment Services and Elec- 
tronic Money – Our Approach. The FCA’s role under the Payment Services 
Regulations 2017 and the Electronic Money Regulations 2011 (2017) 210. 
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‘personalised security credentials’ and other data that can be 
used to carry out fraud. Finally, the provider cannot use, access 
or store any data for other purposes than for the provision of 
the payment initiation service as explicitly requested by the 
payer.21 
2.2. Account information service 
Article 4(16) of the PSD2 defines an account information ser- 
vice as “an online service to provide consolidated information 
on one or more payment accounts held by the payment ser- 
vice user with either another payment service provider or with 
more than one payment service provider”. This broad defini- 
tion covers a wide range of services. 
The PSD2 primarily envisions a service that allows a user 
to obtain information about several payment accounts held 
with one or more banks through a single online interface.22 
However, other services are not excluded. For example, an ac- 
count information service could consist of an analysis of the 
user’s spending habits and the use of this data to provide per- 
sonalised advertisements.23 It could also include the supply of 
the payment data to third parties such as financial advisors or 
credit reference agencies.24 
The account information service provider can only provide 
its services when it has access to the account information. 
This access is regulated by article 67 of the PSD2. For the most 
part, it is shaped in the same way as the access of the payment 
initiation service provider. For example, it is also formulated 
as a right of the payment service user with online access to 
his payment account ( Section 2.1 ). The limitations of the ac- 
cess are also similar. However, the broad definition of ‘account 
information service’ weakens these limitations. 
First, article 67(2)(f) states that the service provider cannot 
use the obtained information for other purposes than for per- 
forming the account information service. For example, it is not 
allowed to use the data to offer other products and services. 
However, this limitation can be circumvented by offering a ser- 
vice that explicitly includes making personalised offers that 
are based on the account information. Moreover, the account 
information service can consist of providing data to a third 
party. It can be a part of a more comprehensive relationship 
such as a credit application. In this example, the account in- 
formation service provider would provide the data to a lender 
that would use them to offer a personalised loan. 
Furthermore, the PSD2 does not clarify whether the ac- 
count information service provider can use the data for other 
purposes if the processing is lawful pursuant to another 
ground such as the additional consent of the user. Article 
67(2)(f) states that the account information service provider 
cannot process the data for other purposes, “in accordance 
with data protection rules”. This addition suggests that the 
data can be processed for other purposes as long as this is 
done in accordance with the General Data Protection Regula- 
21 About these limitations, see PSD2, art 66(3)(c), (e)–(g). 
22 PSD2, recital 28; Donnelly (n 3) 831. 
23 Cf Cortet, Rijks and Nijland (n 3) 24; Hafstad and others (n 10) 
45–47; Financial Conduct Authority (n 20) 16, 214; Caron (n 10) 58. 
24 Financial Conduct Authority (n 20) 16. 
tion (‘GDPR’).25 It is a relevant deviation from the similar ar- 
ticle 66(3)(g) of the PSD2. The prohibition to process the data 
for other purposes than the provision of the payment initia- 
tion service is not qualified in this manner. This suggests that 
a payment initiation service provider cannot circumvent the 
prohibition by obtaining additional consent from the user. 
Next, the PSD2 does not clarify which data fall under the 
scope of the access to accounts.26 Sensitive payment data 
is excluded pursuant to article 67(2)(f). Furthermore, arti- 
cle 67(2)(d) determines that the account information service 
provider can only access information from ‘designated pay- 
ment accounts and associated payment transactions’. In any 
event, the access must be limited to the information that is 
necessary for the provision of the account information service. 
This follows from the principle of ‘data minimisation’ from ar- 
ticle 5(1)(c) of the GDPR.27 However, the necessity of informa- 
tion depends on the offered service. An account information 
service provider can circumvent this limitation by offering a 
broadly defined service. 
A further limitation of the access violates the principles 
and goals of the PSD2. Access to accounts is meant to facilitate 
the provision of account information services by others than 
the banks. It will not fulfil this goal if the user can only access 
a limited amount of data through an account information ser- 
vice. The account information service provider would remain 
in a disadvantaged position compared to the bank. For this 
reason, it should have access to the same data as the user of 
the online banking environment that is offered by the bank.28 
The account information service provider, and not the bank, is 
ultimately responsible for the selection of the necessary data. 
It must implement suitable and effective mechanisms that 
prevent access to other information.29 
The account information of the user can also relate to other 
natural persons. The information that user Alice transferred 
money to (or received money from) Bob, also means that Bob 
received money from (or transferred money to) user Alice. By 
providing an account information service to user Alice, the 
service provider also processes the personal data of Bob. Sim- 
ilarly, the bank processes this data by granting access to the 
25 European Parliament and Council Regulation 2016/679/EU of 27 
April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the 
processing of personal data and on the free movement of such 
data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC [2016] OJ L119/1. About this 
issue, see European Data Protection Board, Letter to Sophie in ‘t Veld , 
5 July 2018, stating that processing for other purposes is possible 
with additional consent. 
26 See also European Banking Federation, Guidance for imple- 
mentation of the revised Payment Services Directive. PSD2 guidance 
(EBF_020819, 2016) 25. 
27 See also EBA, ‘Opinion of the European Banking Authority on 
the European Commission’s intention to partially endorse and 
amend the EBA’s final draft regulatory technical standards on 
strong customer authentication and common and secure commu- 
nication under PSD2’ EBA/OP/2017/09, 8; Sections 2.3 , 4.2 . 
28 RTS, art 36(1)(a); Financial Conduct Authority (n 20) 209. 
29 RTS, art 36(3). About the division of responsibility between 
the bank and payment service provider, see also Sections 2.3 , 4.4 
and 4.5 . 
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account information service provider.30 However, in contrast 
to Alice, Bob has not given consent for this processing. For this 
reason, the processing of this ‘silent party data’ must be based 
on one of the other grounds of article 6(1) of the GDPR.31 This 
problem is not exclusive to the PSD2. It also exists when the 
silent party data is shared on another ground, such as the right 
of access or the right to data portability under the GDPR.32 
Article 6(1)(c) of the GDPR provides a ground for the pro- 
cessing by the bank: as soon as the PSD2 is implemented, the 
bank has a legal obligation to grant access to the account in- 
formation service provider. The lawfulness of the processing 
by the account information service provider can only be based 
on article 6(1)(f) of the GDPR.33 The processing is necessary for 
the purposes of the legitimate interests pursued by the ser- 
vice provider and its user. These legitimate interests must be 
weighed against the interests or fundamental rights and free- 
doms of the data subject. The result of this deliberation de- 
pends on the nature of the account information service. 
If the service consists of providing information about sev- 
eral payment accounts through a single online interface, this 
deliberation is no different from the situation in which the 
user accesses the data in the online banking environment that 
is offered by the bank. After all, Bob has not given consent to 
the processing of his data by the bank. Alice’s interest in get- 
ting an online overview of her transactions, and the interest 
of the bank in offering this service, outweigh the violation of 
the privacy of Bob. One could argue that account information 
service providers are less reliable than banks. Although this 
is a relevant risk, it is not in line with the principles of the 
PSD2. The PSD2 works from the assumption that payment ser- 
vice providers in the sense of article 1 can be trusted. For this 
reason, Alice should also be able to view Bob’s personal data 
through the account information service. 
The result of this deliberation can be different if the data 
are meant for different purposes. For example, an account in- 
formation service can consist of the analysis of the financial 
state of the user. Even before the PSD2, lenders frequently ask 
for financial information, such as a transaction overview, that 
contains data about silent parties. In theory, this data could be 
relevant. For example, frequent payments from Bob to Alice 
can indicate that Alice financially depends on him. However, 
the frequent use of account information services allows third 
30 The “disclosure by transmission, dissemination or otherwise 
making available” is a ‘processing’ of ‘personal data’. GDPR, art 4(1), 
(2). 
31 See also European Data Protection Board (n 25). This is- 
sue has received a lot of attention in the Netherlands. E.g. J.L. 
Jonker and B.M. Dijkmans van Gunst, ‘De getemperde belofte 
van PSD2/XS2A’ [2017] Tijdschrift voor Internetrecht 142, 146–
147; J.A. Voerman, ‘PSD2 als katalysator voor Open Banking’ 
[2017] Tijdschrift voor Compliance 114, 121; Autoriteit Persoons- 
gegevens, ‘Vragen over PSD2’ https://autoriteitpersoonsgegevens. 
nl/nl/onderwerpen/financien/financiele-instellingen accessed 25 
June 2018. 
32 Cf GDPR, arts 15(4), 20(4), recital 63 (the right to obtain a copy 
of the personal data and the right to data portability should not 
adversely affect the rights and freedoms of others). 
33 European Data Protection Board (n 25). In the context of the 
right to data portability, see Article 29 Data Protection Working 
Party, Guidelines on the right to data portability (16/EN WP 242 rev.01, 
2017) 11–12. 
parties to access the silent party data on a much larger scale 
than is done currently. This will lead to a greater violation of 
the privacy of a larger group of silent parties. For this rea- 
son, account information service providers should only pro- 
cess this data to the extent that this is truly necessary for the 
provision of the service to Alice.34 They are not allowed to keep 
or use the data for other purposes. For example, they cannot 
use it to build a profile about Bob or when Bob applies for a 
loan. 
2.3. Access to accounts and the protection of the payment 
service user 
The PSD2 aspires to balance the development of the market 
for payment services with security and privacy ( Section 1 ). In 
this light, the extensive access to accounts is accompanied by 
several safeguards. 
First, the payment services need to be adequately secured. 
Pursuant to article 68(5) and (6) of the PSD2, a bank can deny 
the access to an account for objectively justified and duly evi- 
denced reasons relating to unauthorised or fraudulent access 
to the payment account. It must report the incident to the 
competent authority. The bank should again grant access once 
the objectively justified and duly evidenced reasons no longer 
exist. 
Pursuant to article 95 of the PSD2, payment service 
providers must establish a framework with appropriate mit- 
igation measures and control mechanisms to manage the 
operational and security risks in relation to the payment 
services that they provide. Article 96 obligates them to notify 
the competent authorities and the users in the case of a 
major operational or security incident.35 These obligations 
apply to payment initiation service providers and account 
information service providers, but also to banks. As ‘account 
servicing payment service providers’, banks are also payment 
service providers in the sense of the PSD2.36 
When the user wishes to use a payment initiation service 
or account information service, the providers are obligated 
to apply ‘strong customer authentication’ pursuant to article 
97. This is defined by article 4(30) of the PSD2 as authentica- 
tion that is based on the use of two or more independent ele- 
ments categorised as knowledge, possession and inherence.37 
Finally, the payment service providers and banks must com- 
municate securely with each other.38 
The safeguards are also aimed at the protection of the 
personal data of the user.39 Recital 89 states that directive 
95/46/EC (Data protection) 40 and its national implementations 
apply to the processing of personal data for the provision of 
34 See also European Data Protection Board (n 25). They must also 
able to demonstrate this necessity. GDPR, arts 5(1)(a)–(c), (2), 24(1). 
35 The GDPR also imposes these obligations in relation to per- 
sonal data. GDPR, arts 32-34. See also PSD2, recital 89. 
36 PSD2, art 4(17), Annex I(1), (2). 
37 See also RTS, arts 4-9; Donnelly (n 3) 837. For exceptions, see 
RTS, arts 10–21. 
38 PSD2, arts 66(3)(b), (d), (4)(a), 67(2)(b)–(c), (3)(a). See also 
Section 4.3 . 
39 See also PSD2, arts 66(3)(g), 67(2)(f); Section 2.2 . 
40 Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Coun- 
cil of 24 October 1995 on the protection of individuals with regard 
34 computer law & security review 35 (2019) 29–41 
payment services. For payment initiation service providers, 
this is also laid down in article 94(1) of the PSD2. Pursuant to 
article 94 of the GDPR, these references should be construed 
as references to the GDPR. 
Furthermore, article 94(2) of the PSD2 stipulates that pay- 
ment service providers can only access personal data that are 
necessary for the provision of their services with the explicit 
consent of the user. In this respect, the PSD2 is more restrictive 
than the GDPR. Pursuant to article 6(1)(a) and (b) of the GDPR, 
a processing is lawful if the data subject has given consent or 
if it is necessary for the performance of a contract to which 
the data subject is party. Article 94(2) of the PSD2 demands 
that both conditions are met. Moreover, it requires explicit con- 
sent. According to the European Data Protection Board, this is 
a requirement of a contractual nature that is different from 
the concept of (explicit) consent under the GDPR. When enter- 
ing a contract with a payment service provider, the data sub- 
jects must be made fully aware of the purposes for which their 
personal data will be processed. This must be done through 
clauses that are clearly distinguishable from the other mat- 
ters dealt with in the contract. The data subjects have to ex- 
plicitly agree to these clauses.41 Consent is not required for 
the processing of personal data that is necessary to safeguard 
the prevention, investigation and detection of payment fraud 
pursuant to article 94(1). 
The PSD2 imposes less stringent safeguards on account in- 
formation service providers. First, the broad definition of this 
service allows the provider to circumvent certain limitations 
( Section 2.2 ). Furthermore, article 94 of the PSD2 does not ap- 
ply to account information service providers that do not pro- 
vide other payment services pursuant to article 33(2). This 
does not mean that these providers are not governed by data 
protection law. Even without an explicit clause in the PSD2, the 
GDPR applies to all companies that process personal data.42 
The exception of article 33(2) of the PSD2 only affects the more 
stringent rule of article 94(2). Like under the PSD2, consent un- 
der the GDPR requires that the request is presented in a man- 
ner which is clearly distinguishable from other matters. Fur- 
thermore, it should be requested in an intelligible and easily 
accessible form, using clear and plain language.43 
The absence of more detailed data protection rules for ac- 
count information services is problematic. Access to accounts 
facilitates the processing of account information of users and 
silent parties on a larger scale ( Section 2.2 ). Furthermore, even 
clauses that use plain language and are clearly distinguishable 
from other matters do not guarantee that a user truly reads 
and understands the request for consent. These issues are not 
clarified by the PSD2. For this reason, clarifying guidelines by 
the competent authorities are desirable, especially if the na- 
tional implementations of the PSD2 lead to a great increase in 
the use of payment services. 
to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of 
such data [1995] OJ L281/31. 
41 European Data Protection Board (n 25). 
42 About the scope of the GDPR, see GDPR, arts 1–3. 
43 GDPR, art 7(2); Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Guide- 
lines on Consent under Regulation 2016/679 (17/EN WP259, 2017) 18–
19. 
3. The regulatory technical standards for 
strong customer authentication and common and 
secure open standards of communication 
The European Banking Authority (‘EBA’) plays an important 
role in the elaboration of the safeguards of articles 95, 96 and 
97 of the PSD2. Pursuant to articles 95 and 96, they have the 
obligation to issue ‘guidelines’ about these measures in accor- 
dance with article 16 of the ‘EBA Regulation’.44 This must be 
done in close cooperation with the European Central Bank and 
after consulting all relevant stakeholders. 
Next, article 98(1) obligates the EBA to develop draft regu- 
latory technical standards on strong customer authentication 
and secure communication in accordance with article 10 of 
the EBA Regulation. These ‘RTS’ must work towards a balance 
between the goals of the PSD2.45 As shown in Section 4 , they 
significantly affect the design and security of the access to ac- 
counts. 
Again, the draft must be developed in close coopera- 
tion with the European Central Bank and after consulting 
all relevant stakeholders. After the consultation on the ba- 
sis of a ‘Discussion Paper’ and a ‘Consultation Paper’, the 
EBA published its draft on 23 February 2017.46 However, un- 
like the guidelines of article 16 of the EBA regulation, the 
RTS are ultimately adopted by the European Commission 
pursuant to article 10(1). The content of the RTS were a 
point of contention between the EBA and the European Com- 
mission. Specifically, they debated the legitimacy of ‘screen 
scraping’ ( Section 4.2 ). After some back and forth, the Euro- 
pean Commission adopted the RTS on 27 November 2017.47 
44 Regulation (EU) 1093/2010 of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 24 November 2010 establishing a European Supervi- 
sory Authority (European Banking Authority), amending Decision 
No. 716/2009/EC and repealing Commission Decision 2009/78/EC 
[2010] L331/12. 
45 See also PSD2, art 98(2), recitals 93–94, 96, 108; EBA, ‘Discussion 
Paper on future Draft Regulatory Technical Standards on strong 
customer authentication and secure communication under the re- 
vised Payment Services Directive (PSD2)’ EBA/DP/2015/03, 9; EBA, 
‘Final Report. Draft Regulatory Technical Standards on Strong Cus- 
tomer Authentication and common and secure communication 
under Article 98 of Directive 2015/2366 (PSD2)’ EBA/RTS/2017/02, 
3, 6, 39; EBA, ‘Opinion on the European Commission’s intention’ (n 
27) 2. 
46 EBA, ‘Discussion Paper’ (n 45); EBA, ‘Consultation Paper. On the 
draft Regulatory Technical Standards specifying the requirements 
on strong customer authentication and common and secure com- 
munication under PSD2’ EBA-CP-2016-11; EBA, ‘Final Report’ (n 45). 
Access to accounts was a matter of significant concern during this 
consultation. EBA, ‘Final Report’ (n 45) 3–4, 44, 46. Cf PSD2, art 98(4) 
(the deadline for the draft is 13 January 2017). 
47 Commission, ‘Communication to the Commission on the 
intention to endorse, with amendments, the draft Regula- 
tory Technical Standards submitted by the European Banking 
Authority for strong customer authentication and common 
and secure open standards of communication in accordance 
with Article 98(4) of Directive (EU) 2015/2366’ (Communica- 
tion) C(2017) 3459 final; O. Guersent, ‘Commission intention to 
amend the draft regulatory technical standards on strong cus- 
tomer authentication and common and secure open standards 
of communication submitted by the EBA in accordance with 
Article 98(4) PSD2’ (Letter to A. Enria) Ref. Ares(2017)2639906; 
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They were published on 13 March 2018 and will apply from 14 
September 2019.48 
The delay in the adoption of the RTS affects the balance 
between the goals of the PSD2 during the transitional period. 
Pursuant to article 115, the PSD2 should have been imple- 
mented on 13 January 2018. Payment service providers can 
benefit from the access to accounts from the moment of 
its implementation. Furthermore, payment service providers 
that were active in a member state before 12 January 2016 can 
continue to perform their activities pursuant to article 115(5). 
However, the payment service providers are not bound by the 
corresponding security measures until the application of the 
RTS. Pursuant to article 115(4) of the PSD2, the security mea- 
sures referred to in articles 65, 66, 67 and 97 do not have to 
be applied during the transitional period between 13 January 
2018 and 14 September 2019.49 Instead, they are only bound by 
the more general obligations to manage the operational and 
security risks and to secure the processed personal data.50 
4. Access to accounts under the RTS 
This section analyses the influence of the RTS on the design 
and security of access to accounts under the PSD2. It subse- 
quently discusses the difference between a dedicated and a 
user interface ( Section 4.1 ), the admissibility of ‘screen scrap- 
ing’ ( Section 4.2 ), the role of the authentication procedure 
provided by the bank ( Section 4.3 ), the option of the payment 
service provider to use its own authentication procedure 
( Sections 4.4 and 4.5 ) and the requirements of identification, 
authentication and dynamic links ( Section 4.6 ). For each of 
these topics, the subsection discusses the relevant security 
risks. 
4.1. A dedicated interface or a an adapted user interface 
A bank that offers its users online access to their payment 
accounts, is obligated to have an interface in place that al- 
lows payment service providers to access the accounts pur- 
suant to article 30(1) of the RTS. Pursuant to article 31, the bank 
can choose between a separate ‘dedicated’ interface for pay- 
ment service providers or by allowing them to utilise the user 
interface. 
EBA, ‘Opinion on the European Commission’s intention’ (n 
27); Commission, ‘Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) No 
…/.. of XXX supplementing Directive 2015/2366 of the Euro- 
pean Parliament and of the Council with regard to regulatory 
technical standards for strong customer authentication and com- 
mon and secure open standards of communication’ (amended 
draft by the EBA) […](2017) XXX draft www.eba.europa.eu/-/eba- 
publishes- its- opinion- in- response- to- the- european- commission- 
intention- to- amend- the- eba- technical- standards- for- open- and- 
secure-electronic-payment accessed 25 June 2018; RTS (n 6). 
48 RTS, art 38. 
49 Cf EBA, ‘Final Report’ (n 45) 4, 11–12, 46; Commission, ‘Pay- 
ment Services Directive (PSD2): Regulatory Technical Standards 
(RTS) enabling consumers to benefit from safer and more in- 
novative electronic payments’ (Press release 27 November 2017) 
MEMO/17/4961. 
50 PSD2, art 95; GDPR, art 32. 
Even if the bank chooses the latter option, it cannot simply 
open the user interface to payment service providers. It needs 
to modify the interface. Pursuant to article 30(1) of the RTS, the 
interface must enable the providers to identify themselves, to 
request and receive information one or more designated ac- 
counts and associated transactions and to initiate a payment 
order. Furthermore, it should not provide unlimited access to 
the accounts. Instead, the access should be limited to the in- 
formation that is necessary for the provision of the payment 
services.51 
4.2. The admissibility of ‘screen scraping’ and the 
demands on a dedicated interface 
The payment service providers depend on the bank for the 
provision of their service. They cannot provide their service in 
compliance with the PSD2 if the bank does not offer an ade- 
quately functioning interface. This allows a bank to frustrate 
the desired development of the market for payment services. 
The RTS contain several rules to prevent this. Pursuant to ar- 
ticle 30(3), (4) and (5), a bank is, among other things, obligated 
to follow international or European standards, document and 
provide the technical specifications of its interface, communi- 
cate changes and make a testing facility available. A dedicated 
interface creates additional possibilities to frustrate the com- 
petition on the market for payment services. For example, a 
bank could limit the data that is accessible through this inter- 
face or reduce its speed or availability.52 
Fear of use of these possibilities has influenced the con- 
tent of the RTS. In particular, it has influenced the discussion 
about the admissibility of ‘screen scraping’. With this form of 
access, the payment service provider gains access to the pay- 
ment account without identifying itself. Instead, it receives 
personalised security credentials, such as a PIN, from the pay- 
ment service user to gain access ‘as the user’.53 Several exist- 
ing service providers, such as Sofort in Germany, were using 
this form of access before the adoption of the PSD2.54 Fig. 1 
gives an overview of access to accounts through screen scrap- 
ing. 
A payment service provider that uses this form of access 
violates its obligation to identify itself.55 A bank can take mea- 
sures to discover screen scraping. However, as a starting point, 
it does not know that it is dealing with a payment service 
provider instead of the user. The payment service provider 
gains unlimited access to the online banking environment. It 
gains access to all available information, including sensitive 
payment data and information that is not necessary for the 
51 EBA, ‘Final Report’ (n 45) 110, 113; EBA, ‘Opinion on the Euro- 
pean Commission’s intention’ (n 27) 8; EBA, ‘Opinion of the Euro- 
pean Banking Authority on the implementation of the RTS on SCA 
and CSC’ EBA-Op-2018-04, 3–6. 
52 E.g. EBA, ‘Final Report’ (n 45) 11, 46, 113; EBA, ‘Opinion on the 
European Commission’s intention’ (n 27) 7. 
53 EBA, ‘Final Report’ (n 45) 4; EBA, ‘Opinion on the European Com- 
mission’s intention’ (n 27) 8. Cf n 54. 
54 E.g. ‘PSD2 RTS on secure communication and screen scrap- 
ing’ ( ThePaypers 2 May 2017) www.thepaypers.com/interviews/ 
psd2- rts- on- secure- communication- and- screen- scraping/ 
768765-38 accessed 25 June 2018. 
55 PSD2, arts 66(3)(d), 67(2)(c). 
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Fig. 1 – ‘Screen scraping’. 
provision of the service. For these reasons, the draft of the EBA 
prohibited screen scraping.56 
Payment service providers lobbied against this prohibi- 
tion.57 They argued that they should keep the option to gain 
access through the user interface, especially if the dedicated 
interface does not function adequately. The draft by the EBA 
did not contain such a ‘fall back option’. However, it did de- 
mand that the dedicated interface offered the same level of 
availability and performance as the user interface. Further- 
more, the bank was obligated to take measures to prevent and 
repair malfunctions.58 
The European Commission has been more receptive to 
the lobby of the payment service providers. Its draft of May 
2017 allowed the payment service providers to utilise the 
user interface if the dedicated interface malfunctioned and 
certain other conditions were met.59 Among other things, 
the payment service provider had to identify itself. The bank 
was obligated to ensure that the user interface facilitated this 
identification. 
The EBA was opposed to this fall back option. Among other 
objections, it stated that this solution can force banks to main- 
tain both a dedicated interface and an adapted user inter- 
face that allows identification. To avoid these costs, they may 
decide to abandon the development of a standardised dedi- 
cated interface altogether. This increases the costs for new 
payment service providers and hinders the development of 
a single European market for payment services.60 Instead, 
the EBA proposed more stringent requirements for dedicated 
interfaces.61 
56 EBA, ‘Final Report’ (n 45) 4, 11, 46, 113, 117–118; EBA, ‘Opinion on 
the European Commission’s intention’ (n 27) 8. See also Sections 
2.1 , 2.2 . 
57 E.g. Future of European Fintech, ‘Manifesto for the im- 
pact of PSD2 on the future of European Fintech’ (2017) www. 
futureofeuropeanfintech.com/assets/Manifesto- for- the- impact- of- 
PSD2- on- the- future- of- European- Fintech.pdf accessed 25 June 
2018; ‘EBA rejects Commission amendments on screen scrap- 
ing under PSD2’ ( Finextra 30 June 2017) www.finextra.com/ 
newsarticle/30772/eba- rejects- commission- amendments- on- 
screen- scraping- under- psd2 accessed 25 June 2018. 
58 EBA, ‘Final Report’ (n 45), art 28. 
59 Guersent (n 47), art 33(3). 
60 In more detail, see EBA, ‘Opinion on the European Commis- 
sion’s intention’ (n 27) 8–11. 
61 Amended draft by the EBA (n 47), arts 31, 32. 
The European Commission was partly convinced by these 
objections.62 Article 33(4) of the adopted RTS still contains the 
fall back option. However, the competent authorities can ex- 
empt a bank pursuant to article 33(6) if the dedicated interface 
complies with all of the obligations as set out in article 32, has 
been tested by the payment service providers, has been widely 
used for at least three months and any problems have been 
resolved without undue delay. The EBA has published a con- 
sultation paper for the draft guidelines on these conditions. It 
allows a bank to obtain an exemption before the RTS apply.63 
Article 33(6) of the RTS allows a bank to avoid the costs 
of maintaining the adapted user interface. Furthermore, it 
strengthens the protection of the personal data of the users. 
If the bank is exempted and the transitional period has ended 
( Section 3 ), payment service providers will under no circum- 
stances be allowed to use screen scraping. 
4.3. The authentication procedure of the bank 
The interface that is offered by the bank should allow the pay- 
ment service providers to rely on all the authentication proce- 
dures that are provided by the bank to the user.64 This option 
facilitates the provision of payment services. It allows a pay- 
ment service provider to offer its services without developing 
and using its own strong customer authentication. The pay- 
ment service providers can instruct the bank to start their au- 
thentication procedure along with the payment order or the 
request for information. The RTS do not clarify how this au- 
thentication should be resolved. Figs. 2 and 3 display the most 
important variations. 
The interface should establish and maintain communi- 
cation sessions between the bank, payment service provider 
and user pursuant to article 30(2)(b) of the RTS. The exis- 
tence of a communication session between the bank and the 
user suggests that the authentication can be resolved without 
the involvement of the payment service provider. Instead, the 
62 Commission, ‘Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) no …/.. 
of XXX supplementing Directive 2015/2366 of the European Parlia- 
ment and of the Council with regard to regulatory technical stan- 
dards for strong customer authentication and common and secure 
open standards of communication’ C(2017) 7782 final, 4. 
63 Cf EBA, ‘Consultation Paper. Draft Guidelines on the conditions 
to be met to benefit from an exemption from contingency mea- 
sures under Article 33(6) of Regulation (EU) 2018/389 (RTS on SCA 
& CSC)’ EBA/CP/2018/09, paras 14, 54–59, 69–71. 
64 PSD2, recital 30, 69, 96; RTS, art 30(2). 
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Fig. 2 – Redirection or decoupled approach. 
Fig. 3 – Embedded approach. 
payment service provider redirects the user to the bank or the 
authentication is done through a decoupled approach.65 
Under this system, the payment service provider does not 
process personalised security credentials in any way. This is 
in accordance with the goals of the PSD2. An account infor- 
mation service provider is not allowed to request sensitive 
payment data, including personalised security credentials 
( Section 2.2 ). A payment initiation service provider cannot 
store them ( Section 2.1 ). Furthermore, article 5(1)(g) of the 
PSD2 obligates a payment institution to submit a description 
of the process that is used to restrict access to sensitive 
payment data at the time of the application for authorisation. 
The system of Fig. 2 limits the security risks to a min- 
imum.66 The payment service provider has no access to 
personalised security credentials and cannot abuse them. 
Furthermore, criminals cannot steal or intercept security cre- 
dentials from the payment service provider. These advantages 
do not exist if the authentication, including the personalised 
security credentials issued by the bank, are resolved in whole 
or in part through the payment service provider via an em- 
bedded approach.67 This system also facilitates fraud. Before 
the PSD2, banks have warned customers to never share their 
65 See also EBA, ‘Opinion on the implementation’ (n 51) 11. 
66 See also Cortet, Rijks and Nijland (n 3) 24. 
67 See also EBA, ‘Opinion on the implementation’ (n 51) 11. 
PIN or other security credentials with others. These warnings 
cannot be given if the PSD2 allows the system of Fig. 3 . This 
enables a criminal to pose as a legitimate payment service 
provider in order to induce a user to share his personalised 
security credentials. 
Several norms suggest that this system is allowed. The ar- 
ticles 66(3)(b) and 67(2)(b) of the PSD2 state that the payment 
service providers should ensure that personalised security 
credentials are not accessible to other parties with the excep- 
tion of the user and the issuer of the credentials. Furthermore, 
the articles obligate them to transmit personalised security 
credentials through safe and efficient channels. Next, article 
30(2) of the RTS states that the interface should ensure the 
integrity and confidentiality of the credentials that are trans- 
mitted by or through the payment service providers. Finally, 
the payment service providers should ensure that transmitted 
personalised security credentials and authentication codes 
are not readable by any staff at any time pursuant to article 
35(5) of the RTS. They are obligated to inform the user and 
the issuer in case of a loss of confidentiality of the credentials 
under their sphere of competence. These norms illustrate 
that the payment service providers can be an intermediate 
in the authentication procedure that is provided by another 
party such as the bank.68 
68 See also EBA, ‘Final Report’ (n 45) 118, 123, 145–147. 
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Fig. 4 – The additional risks. 
4.4. An authentication procedure of the payment service 
provider 
The payment initiation service provider and account informa- 
tion service provider are obligated to apply strong customer 
authentication ( Section 2.3 ). They have the right to use the 
procedure that is provided by the bank ( Section 4.3 ). However, 
the PSD2 and RTS do not obligate them to use this procedure. 
They can also utilise another form of two-factor authentica- 
tion. The development of user-friendly means of payment is 
one of the objectives of the PSD2. Fast and convenient authen- 
tication procedures contribute to this goal.69 
An authentication procedure that is offered by the pay- 
ment service provider is required to comply with the PSD2 
and the RTS. It is governed by the same legal security stan- 
dards as the authentication procedure of the bank. Nonethe- 
less, the use of alternative authentication procedures creates 
additional risks. Fig. 4 gives an overview of these risks. 
If only the authentication procedure of the bank can be 
used, criminals can only gain illegal access if they manage to 
69 E.g. PSD2, art 98(2)(e), recital 30; EBA, ‘Discussion Paper’ (n 45) 
9, 18–19, 27; Gerd Cimiotti and Christina Nadine Dahl, ‘Paying in 
2025: Scenarios for payment systems in Germany in 2025’ (2016) 
10 Journal of Payment Strategy & Systems 253, 255–256; EBA, ‘Final 
Report’ (n 45) 38, 41, 117; Section 2.1 . Cf PSD2, arts 64(2) (“Consent 
to execute a payment transaction or a series of payment transac- 
tions shall be given in the form agreed between the payer and the 
payment service provider. Consent to execute a payment trans- 
action may also be given via the payee or the payment initia- 
tion service provider”), 66(4)(c), 67(3)(b) (an account servicing pay- 
ment provider shall treat the payment orders and data requests 
transmitted through the services of a payment initiation service 
provider or account information service provider without any dis- 
crimination); RTS, art 36(4) (“Payment initiation service providers 
shall provide account servicing payment service providers with 
the same information requested from the payment service user 
when initiating the payment transaction directly”). It could be ar- 
gued that ‘the form agreed’, ‘the same information’ and ‘with- 
out any discrimination’ also refers to the authentication. However, 
this interpretation does not correspond to the goals of the PSD2. 
Furthermore, if a payment service provider decides to rely on the 
strong customer authentication of the bank, the decision to apply 
an exemption also remains with the bank. EBA, ‘Opinion on the 
implementation’ (n 51) 8. 
circumvent or break this procedure. The authentication pro- 
cedures of the payment service providers lead to a multiplica- 
tion of the attack vectors, even if they are secured just as well 
as the procedures of the bank. The mere fact that more pro- 
cedures can be used, increases the chance that one of them 
contains a vulnerability that is discovered and exploited by a 
criminal. 
This is amplified by the fact that, without the use of its own 
authentication procedure or a digital signature ( Section 4.6 ), 
a bank is not able to judge if the user of the payment ser- 
vice is the same person as the account holder. It cannot 
verify whether the holder truly consents to the access to 
his account.70 Instead, it must rely on the payment ser- 
vice provider. In theory, every authorised payment initiation 
service provider or registered account information service 
provider can gain access to every payment account, even if it 
does not have consent from or a contractual relationship with 
the alleged user. Similarly, (foreign) intelligence services and 
criminals can gain access to an account by hacking into the 
computer system of any payment service provider. Alterna- 
tively, they can gain access if they obtain their own authorisa- 
tion or registration to become a payment institution. 
4.5. One-time authorisation with the authentication 
procedure of the bank 
The additional risks can be limited by demanding the one- 
time, or yearly, authorisation of the payment service provider 
with the authentication procedure of the bank. Although this 
safeguard does not remove all of the additional attack vectors, 
it reduces the risks to payment service providers that have 
been authorised by the user. 
Article 95(1) of the PSD2 obligates the payment ser- 
vice providers to limit the risks in relation to their payment 
70 See also Financial Conduct Authority (n 20) 137; EBA, 
‘Consultation Paper. Draft Guidelines’ (n 63) guideline 5.2(c); 
EBA, ‘Opinion on the implementation’ (n 51) 4; Implemen- 
tatiebesluit herziene richtlijn betaaldiensten (clarification of the 
proposed Dutch implementation) www.internetconsultatie.nl/ 
implementatiebesluitherzienerichtlijnbetaaldiensten accessed 25 
June 2018), 16–17. 
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services.71 The prevention of unauthorised access is one of the 
goals of this obligation.72 One-time authorisation contributes 
to its performance. Furthermore, the use of the authentication 
procedure of the payment service provider does not prove that 
the user is also the account holder.73 For example, a payment 
service provider that uses a fingerprint for the authentication, 
does not know whether the fingerprint is also associated with 
the account holder. Similarly, this cannot be verified by a bank 
that does base its authentication on a fingerprint. For this 
reason, the payment service provider should associate the 
identities of the user and the account holder with each other. 
Although the PSD2 does not prescribe the authentication 
procedure of the bank, the one-time authorisation is a secure 
and user-friendly way to establish this association.74 
This does not automatically mean that a bank can also 
refuse the access until the payment service provider has been 
authorised. Such a right or obligation is not explicitly incorpo- 
rated in the PSD2 or the RTS.75 However, several norms provide 
a potential legal basis. First, article 68(5) of the PSD2 states that 
a bank can deny the access for objectively justified and duly 
evidenced reasons relating to unauthorised or fraudulent ac- 
cess to the payment account ( Section 2.3 ). Next, article 95 also 
applies to the bank. Although the risks are primarily related 
to the payment initiation and account information services, 
the abuse is only possible if the access is actually granted. For 
this reason, the risks are also related to the provision of a pay- 
ment account. Finally, article 2 of the RTS obligates payment 
service providers, including banks, to have transaction moni- 
toring mechanisms in place that enable them to detect unau- 
thorised or fraudulent payment transactions. 
The requirement of a one-time authorisation will surely be 
justified if other circumstances also suggest that a risk of fraud 
exists.76 For example, such additional circumstances could ex- 
ist if the spending pattern is abnormal.77 Furthermore, a bank 
could demand the one-time authorisation if it knows or ob- 
jectively suspects that the payment service provider does not 
use another authentication procedure that fulfils the require- 
ments of the PSD2 and establishes the association of the iden- 
tities of the user and the account holder. 
71 Section 2.3 . See also PSD2, arts 5(1)(e), (i), (j), 11(4). Account in- 
formation service providers are exempted from PSD2, arts 5(1)(i), 
11(4). PSD2, art 33(1). 
72 EBA, ‘Consultation Paper. On the draft Regulatory Technical 
Standards’ (n 46) 8, 21. 
73 Cf RTS, art 24 about the association of the identity of the user 
and his personalised security credentials. 
74 In a more general sense, banks can benefit from the PSD2 and 
open banking by offering digital identity services. Finextra (n 10) 
22-23. E.g. ‘iDIN’, online identification based on the authentication 
of Dutch banks. www.idin.nl accessed 25 June 2018. The associa- 
tion can also be established through other digital identity services 
that can ascertain that the user is also the account holder. E.g. 
‘IRMA’ https://privacybydesign.foundation/en/ accessed 25 June 
2018. 
75 N 69. Cf Temenos (n 10) 14. 
76 See also Financial Conduct Authority (n 20) 211 (the mere fact 
that a customer uses a payment initiation or account information 
service is insufficient). 
77 See a contrario the criteria for an exception from the obligation 
to apply strong customer authentication based on a transaction 
risk analysis. RTS, art 18(c); Steennot (n 3) 960. 
Furthermore, article 68(1) of the PSD2 allows the payment 
service provider and payer to agree on spending limits when 
a specific ‘payment instrument’,78 such as a payment initia- 
tion service, is used to give consent. Although this is not ex- 
plicitly stated in the article, a textual reading suggests that 
a bank, as an account servicing payment service provider, can 
also impose these spending limits in the contract with its user. 
Furthermore, if a general spending limit is allowed, it should 
also be possible to stipulate that the limit only applies if the 
payment service provider is not authorised with the authen- 
tication procedure of the bank. Next, article 68(2) states that 
the ‘framework contract’ 79 can create a right for the payment 
service provider to block the payment instrument for objec- 
tively justified reasons relating to the security of the payment 
instrument or the suspicion of unauthorised or fraudulent use 
of the payment instrument. 
If, and under what circumstances, a bank can demand the 
one-time authorisation of the payment service provider, is 
not clarified by the PSD2 or the RTS. This demand strengthens 
the security of the payment account and personal data of the 
user. However, it also limits the competition on the market 
for payment services because it creates an additional obstacle 
for the use of the services. Nonetheless, this limitation is 
marginal, especially in the light of the security obligations of 
the payment service providers. 
Larger limitations of the access to accounts could violate 
the PSD2. The justified goal of the prevention of fraud cannot 
be abused as an instrument to restrict the competition. For 
this reason, a bank cannot too easily deny the access for 
objectively justified and duly evidenced reasons relating to 
unauthorised or fraudulent access to the payment account. 
Similarly, the contractual limitations should not go further 
than necessary to prevent fraud and protect the user. 
4.6. Identification, authentication and dynamic linking 
The payment service providers are obligated to identify them- 
selves towards the bank ( Sections 4.1 and 4.2 ). For this pur- 
pose, article 34 of the RTS requires them to use qualified cer- 
tificates for electronic seals or for website authentication as 
referred to in article 3(30) and (39) of the ‘eIDAS regulation’.80 
The annexes III and IV of the eIDAS regulation stipulate the 
requirements for these certificates. Among other things, they 
should contain an ‘advanced electronic signature’ of a ‘quali- 
fied trust service provider’ .81 The certificates do not only allow 
‘identification’. They also enable ‘authentication’. They allow 
a payment service provider to prove its identity to the bank. 
The payment service providers are obligated to apply 
strong customer authentication or rely on the procedure of 
the bank ( Sections 2.3 , 4.3 and 4.4 ). The articles 4 and 5 of the 
RTS further develop this obligation. Pursuant to article 4, the 
78 PSD2, art 4(14). 
79 PSD2, art 4(21). 
80 Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 of the European Parliamant and of 
the Council of 23 July 2014 on electronic identification and trust 
services for electronic transactions in the internal market and re- 
pealing Directive 1999/93/EC [2014] OJ L257/73. 
81 About these concepts, see eIDAS regulation, arts 3(11), (20) and 
26. 
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authentication of the payer must be based on two or more ele- 
ments which are categorised as knowledge, possession and in- 
herence and should result in the generation of an ‘authentica- 
tion code’. The payer must use this code to access the payment 
account, initiate an electronic payment transaction or to carry 
out any action through a remote channel which may imply a 
risk of payment fraud or other abuses. The code must meet 
several requirements. It should be unforgeable, only be ac- 
cepted once, not contain information on any of the elements 
and be impossible to generate based on the knowledge of pre- 
viously generated codes. 
The articles 97(2) of the PSD2 and 5(1) of the RTS demand a 
‘dynamic link’ for electronic remote payment transactions.82 
This means that the generated authentication code should be 
linked to a specific amount and a specific payee. Any change 
should invalidate it. This establishes the ‘integrity’ of the pay- 
ment order. However, the RTS do not seem to require that 
third parties, such as banks, are able to verify this. It does 
not demand that the authentication code is secured by a 
digital signature or another technique that establishes ‘non- 
repudiation’. Furthermore, the payment service provider is 
obligated to make the payer aware of the amount and the 
payee. Pursuant to article 5(2) of the RTS, the payment service 
provider should take security measures to ensure the confi- 
dentiality, authenticity and integrity of the amount, the payee 
and the displayed information throughout all of the phases of 
the authentication. 
Although article 5 of the RTS only applies to electronic 
remote payment transactions, the underlying principles can 
also be used for account information services. In this scenario, 
a change in the privileged service provider or the scope of 
the access would invalidate the authentication code. Further- 
more, the user would have to be made aware of the privileged 
provider and the exact scope of the access throughout all of 
the phases of the authentication. 
The PSD2 and RTS use several related concepts.83 The 
concepts ‘identification’, ‘authentication’ and ‘digital signa- 
ture’ are related but give fundamentally different guarantees. 
They achieve different security goals. The RTS impose more 
stringent security measures than the PSD2. The required 
identification of payment service providers is strengthened 
by demanding the use of certificates that also allow au- 
thentication. For electronic remote payment transactions, 
article 5 of the RTS enhances the required authentication 
by also imposing, among other things, a dynamic link that 
establishes integrity. However, this obligation only exists in 
the relationship between the user and the authenticating 
payment service provider. The RTS do not require that the 
authentication code is secured by a digital signature. The 
bank does not need to be able to verify the authentication 
or the integrity of the payment order.84 The RTS probably 
do not impose this requirement because digital signature 
technology is not in wide-spread use yet. However, it is right 
thing to use in this situation, not only because of additional 
82 See also PSD2, recital 95; Steennot (n 3) 959. 
83 About these concepts, see also Phillip J. Windley, Digital Identity 
(O’Reilly Media 2005) chs 6–7. 
84 See also RTS, recital 4. The recital only mentions a digital sig- 
nature as one of the possibilities to create a dynamic link. 
security guarantees (non-repudiation), but also because 
signed statements can be passed on by the payment service 
provider and can be verified by the bank itself. Without this 
requirement, the RTS do not take away the additional risks 
that are created by allowing payment service providers to use 
their own authentication procedures ( Section 4.4 ). Fig. 5 gives 
an overview of the differences between the PSD2 and the RTS. 
5. Synthesis and conclusion 
This article addresses the following research question: To what 
extent does the access to accounts of the payment initiation service 
providers and account information service providers balance the de- 
velopment of the market for payment services with the security of the 
payment account and the privacy of the user ? An analysis of the 
PSD2 and the RTS shows that the development of the market 
for payment services has a higher priority. Security and pri- 
vacy are ultimately subordinate. 
First, the PSD2 does not adequately protect the personal 
data of the users. On the one hand, the access to accounts 
is limited in several ways and the GDPR applies to the pro- 
vision of payment services ( Section 2.3 ). However, the defi- 
nition of ‘account information service’ is broad and covers a 
wide range of services. This facilitates innovation on the mar- 
ket for payment services but also allows the payment service 
providers to circumvent the limitations of the access to ac- 
counts ( Section 2.2 ). Furthermore, the PSD2 does not address 
the privacy consequences that can result from the large scale 
processing of account information ( Section 2.3 ). 
The compromise about the admissibility of screen scrap- 
ing leads to a similar conclusion ( Section 4.2 ). Screen scrap- 
ing gives a payment service provider unlimited access to the 
account of the user, even if this access is not necessary for 
the provision of the payment service. For this reason, the EBA 
has advocated for a prohibition. However, the European Com- 
mission has decided that the risk of a restriction of the com- 
petition is more important. The adopted RTS allow payment 
service providers to utilise the user interface if the dedicated 
interface is not functioning properly. This access to the user 
interface is constrained by several safeguards. However, these 
safeguards only enable ex-post review, after the payment ser- 
vice provider has already had unlimited access. Again, the 
protection of the innovation and competition on the market 
for payment services trumps the security of the payment ac- 
counts and the privacy of the users. The possibility of an ex- 
emption does not diminish the conclusion. After all, a bank 
can only obtain such an exemption if the dedicated interface 
complies with all of the requirements of the RTS has been 
tested by the payment service providers, has been widely used 
for at least three months and any problems have been re- 
solved without undue delay. There is no real risk of a restric- 
tion of the innovation and competition if these conditions are 
met. 
The norms on strong customer authentication also em- 
phasise innovation and competition over the security of the 
payment account. The payment service providers have the 
right to rely on the authentication process of the bank. How- 
ever, the RTS do not clarify how this process should be re- 
solved ( Section 4.3 ). Instead, the freedom of the payment 
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service providers to arrange the authentication as they see 
fit outweighs the interest of making this process as secure as 
possible. Even though redirection or a decoupled approach can 
be more secure, the PSD2 and the RTS suggest that the au- 
thentication, including the personalised security credentials 
issued by the bank, can also be resolved through the payment 
service provider via an embedded approach. 
This ordering of interests also applies if the payment ser- 
vice providers use their own authentication process. Although 
the PSD2 does not state this explicitly, the bank seems to be 
required to rely on the payment service provider. The PSD2 
and RTS do not demand that the bank is able to verify the au- 
thentication. For example, it cannot require a digital signature 
from the user ( Sections 4.4 –4.6 ). The bank only has limited op- 
tions to restrict the access to accounts ( Section 4.5 ). For this 
reason, it only has a limited power to restrict the provision of 
payment services. However, it also leads to a multiplication of 
the risks. In theory, a criminal can gain access to an account 
through every payment initiation or account information ser- 
vice provider. 
The RTS increase the security. They impose more stringent 
security measures than the PSD2 ( Section 4.6 ). At the same 
time, they do not alter the principal ordering of the PSD2: pay- 
ment service providers have extensive opportunities to offer 
their services, even if this increases the risks. 
The PSD2 prioritises the development of the market for 
payment services over the security of the payment account 
and the privacy of the user. This does not automatically mean 
that the users are not adequately protected. In the end, it de- 
pends on the reliability of the payment service providers. The 
PSD2 assumes that they can be trusted as long as they com- 
ply with the requirements for an authorisation or registration 
( Section 2 ). This assumption will be tested in the next few 
years. The security of the payment accounts and the privacy 
of the users could come under pressure if, in some member 
states or in the entire European Union, the authorisations are 
granted too easily or if the supervision by the competent au- 
thorities is lacking. Furthermore, they could be at risk if the 
payment service providers start using a large variety of al- 
ternative authentication processes without properly testing 
them. 
This places the banks in a troublesome position. The 
removal of their legal monopoly to the access to accounts 
is the most important goal of the PSD2. A measure against 
the abuse of this access can easily be interpreted as an 
illegal restriction of the competition. At the same time, the 
banks are obligated to protect personal data and prevent 
fraud ( Section 4.5 ). They can use these legal obligations to 
limit the access of unreliable third parties and stimulate the 
development of secure alternative authentication processes 
in cooperation with legitimate payment service providers and 
competent authorities. However, these options should never 
be used to restrict competition. 
The PSD2 does not guarantee security and privacy when 
these goals conflict with the development of the market for 
payment services. In these situations, security and privacy de- 
pend on the application of the PSD2. They rely on the provi- 
sion and use of payment services and the development of the 
legal norms by banks, payment service providers and compe- 
tent authorities. 
